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Abstract: We consider the effects of international environmental agreements, using the Sofia Protocol 
on the reduction of nitrogen oxides. Our analysis utilizes panel data from 25 European countries for 
the period 1980–96. We divide these countries into “participants” and “non-participants”—that is, 
those that did and those that did not ratify the Sofia Protocol, respectively. Using a difference in 
difference estimator, we find that signing the treaty has a significant positive impact on emission 
reduction. The yearly reduction is approximately 2.4 percent greater than it would have been without 
the Sofia Protocol. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the detrimental effects of pollution across borders were first recognized in the 1950s, 
the world has seen an increasing number of international environmental agreements (IEAs) 
being signed. By 1994, Barrett (1994, p. 878) reports that more than 100 IEAs were in force. 
There is general agreement that dealing with environmental problems that cross country 
borders, such as global warming and acidification, requires some form of international co-
operation. Without co-operation, each country has an incentive to free-ride on emission 
reductions from other countries, and countries that would benefit from co-operation end in a 
prisoners’-dilemma situation. The existence of IEAs is often seen as evidence that these 
voluntary agreements are successful. However, signing an IEA does not necessarily imply 
successful realization of co-operative gains. Whether an agreement is successful depends on 
whether it has an effect on the signatory countries’ pollution policies. Thus, we consider an 
IEA to be successful if the signatory countries reduce their emissions more than they would 
have done without the agreement. In this paper, we aim to provide a partial answer to the 
question of whether an agreement has an effect on signatory countries’ pollution policies by a 
case study of the Sofia Protocol for nitrogen oxide reduction.  
The bulk of the economics literature on the success of IEAs concludes that they “tend to 
codify Nash behaviour and, as such, do not present much of a co-operative gain”, (Arce and 
Sandler 2001, p. 494). This conclusion is supported by Murdoch et al. (1997a), who 
empirically evaluated both the Helsinki Protocol on the reduction of sulfur in Europe and the 
Sofia Protocol on the reduction of nitrogen oxides, by estimating emission reductions for 25 
European countries from 1980 to 1990. Murdoch et al. (1997b) analyse the Montreal Protocol 
on the reduction of CFCs, and their empirical results show that agreed emission ceilings under 
this agreement are more in line with non-co-operative Nash behaviour than with the co-
operative behaviour of governments.    2
This view is further supported by simulation studies of IEAs, such as the Helsinki 
Protocol on the reduction of sulfur (Mähler 1990), the Oslo Protocol on further sulfur 
reductions (Finus and Tjøtta 2003), and the 1997 Montreal Protocol on limits to the emission 
of ozone-depleting substances (Barrett 2001).
1 
Finally, most of the theoretical literature on co-operation in IEAs predicts that co-
operation is rather limited. Barrett (1994) explores a self-enforcing IEA within a two-period 
model. In the first period, countries decide whether to participate, and in the second period, 
participating and non-participating countries determine their emission levels non-co-
operatively. This model predicts that the number of participating countries is limited and that 
self-enforcing international agreements may not be able to improve substantially upon the 
non-co-operative outcome. Results from similar models by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993, 
1998) and Hoel (1992) also predict that co-operation is relatively limited. Lange and Vogt 
(2003) explain the large number of observed international co-operations by arguing that these 
are driven by a sense of equity in addition to self-interest. To sum up, the economic literature 
argues that participation in international agreements does not change countries’ pollution 
policies or realize efficiency gains through co-operation. 
In this paper, we take another approach to assessing the potential of IEAs. We consider 
‘The 1988 Sofia Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their 
Transboundary Fluxes’. In a typical agreement, such as the Sofia Protocol, signatory countries 
agree to stabilize or reduce emissions of a specific pollutant. We focus on emission reductions 
and, in particular, on the question: do signatory countries reduce their respective emissions 
more than they would have done without the agreement? The Sofia agreement is well suited 
as a case study, since there are good data on emissions before and after the agreement. 
                                                           
1 The formal titles of the protocols are: ‘The Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions and their Fluxes at 
least by 30 Percent’, signed in Helsinki in 1985, ‘The Protocol for further Reduction of Sulfur Emissions’, 
signed in Oslo in 1994, and ‘The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer’, signed in 
Montreal in 1987.    3
Nevertheless, the main obstacle to providing an answer to the above question is the lack of a 
counterfactual. In other words, we do not know what emissions would have emerged without 
the agreement. Our approach, following the evaluation literature, is to argue that under certain 
conditions, non-signatory countries constitute a relevant comparison group. 
The Sofia Protocol, formally entitled ‘The Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions 
of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes’, was signed in Sofia on 1 November 1988. 
It requires the parties to the agreement to freeze their emissions of nitrogen oxides at the 1987 
level before 1994. As a comparison group, we use countries that ratified the ‘Framework 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979’ (the LRTAP convention). 
These countries were invited to join negotiations and to sign the Sofia Protocol but did not do 
so.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain the historical 
background for the Sofia Protocol. In section 3, we outline a theoretical model for the 
emission of a pollutant from a country. In section 4, we present the econometric model, 
emphasizing program evaluation principles. In section 5, we present a description of the data 
and our main results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Historical background  
The damaging effects of acidification in Europe were discovered in the 1950s and 1960s in 
relation to their effect on fish stocks in Scandinavia. Since then, the situation has deteriorated. 
In southern Norway, for example, fish populations have sustained extensive damage or even 
disappeared over an area of about 86,000 square kilometres. The affected area has roughly 
doubled in size since 1970. The process of acidification also results in the increased presence 
of aluminium and other toxic metals in the ground water, and these effects are considered to 
be among the causes of forest decline in Europe. In addition, nitrogen oxides and their   4
transboundary fluxes cause serious health threats to vulnerable persons by reducing air 
quality.  
For many European countries, deposits of nitrogen oxides are caused by winds blowing 
them in from other countries. The deposits either fall to earth or combine with water vapour, 
which is later deposited as rain or snow. These air pollutants can be carried by winds for 
hundreds or even thousands of kilometres before being deposited in soil or water. The 
deposition process is a clear case of rivalry because one ton of deposition in one country 
cannot be deposited in another country. Air quality and transboundary fluxes, however, are 
not rival goods, since the same airborne particles can influence persons at risk not just inside 
one country but also in different countries. Clearly, nitrogen oxide emissions create 
externalities across countries. Emission decisions in one country have environmental and 
health consequences in other countries. In the absence of a market mechanism to adjust for 
these externalities, this will lead to an inefficient resource allocation. The transboundary 
aspects of nitrogen emissions as well as other environmental problems call for some form of 
co-operation between countries.  
The Stockholm Conference of 1972 made the decision to establish the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) to adopt recommendations on international co-operation 
on a broad range of environmental problems. One of the first agreements in this programme 
was the LRTAP convention of 1979, which constituted a declaration of goodwill and served 
as a framework for follow-up protocols.
2 In 1984, 22 countries signed the monitoring and 
evaluation protocol, ‘The Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of Long-
Range Transmission of Air Pollution in Europe’ (EMEP). This protocol requires that 
signatories report their emission to the treaty secretariat. Subsequent protocols followed, 
regulating the specific pollutants that cause acidification. The Helsinki Protocol of 1985 and 
                                                           
2 http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/welcome.html and its follow-up protocols.   5
the Sofia Protocol of 1988, which is the object of this study, were the first of nine protocols 
signed between the time of the LRTAP convention and 2001. 
The Sofia Protocol requires the parties to the agreement to freeze their emissions of 
nitrogen oxides or their transboundary fluxes at the 1987 level before 1994. Like most of the 
environmental agreements, the Sofia Protocol is a voluntary agreement with no economic 
transfers or compensations explicitly stated in the protocol texts. Hence, there are no explicit 
sanction possibilities. In the case of disagreement between the parties, according to Article 12 
in the Protocol, “(i) f a dispute arises between two or more Parties as to the interpretation or 
application of the present Protocol, they shall seek a solution by negotiation or by any other 
method of dispute settlement acceptable to the parties to the dispute”. An important exception 
to this general rule is the Montreal Protocol, which explicitly mentions compensation in the 
form of side payments. 
According to the Protocol homepage, in 1994 or a previous year where no recent data 
are available, the parties to the Protocol had reduced their total emissions by 9% compared to 
the reference year, which was 1987 for all countries except for the United States, which joined 
in 1978.
3 Furthermore, 19 of the 25 parties to the Protocol have reached the target or reduced 
emissions below that level.  
 
3. A model for emissions from a country 
We describe a model for emission of a pollutant in a country i with  i N  individuals. To 
conserve notation, we omit time subscripts. The environmental quality  i Q in country i depends 
on the country’s own emission i Y as well as emissions  i j j Y ≠ } {  from other countries j.  
We define the coefficient ji α as the proportion of total emissions released by emitter j, 
which are deposited at receptor i. The α  parameters capture the external aspects of airborne   6
pollution, such as nitrogen oxides, as a one ton deposit at receptor j cannot be deposited at 
other receptors. In addition, these coefficients capture negative public aspects of airborne 
pollution, as the same ton of a pollutant may be aloft over other countries and hence may put 
many different persons at risk. We use the total deposit of the pollutant as a proxy for the total 
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The coefficients ji α  reflect annual wind patterns, meteorological conditions and the 
geographical distribution of sources of pollutant.  
We define emissions in a country i as pollution less abatement. The pollutant is a by-
product in the production of a private consumer good, and  i c denotes the average consumption 
of the private good. Resources available for abatement are nation i’s income  i I  (gross 
national income) less total consumption i ic N . Emissions are then:  
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where we assume  0 (.) ' > i P , 0 (.) ' ' < i P , and 0 (.) ' > i A . The abatement technology is 
characterized by decreasing (increasing) returns to scale if  0 (.) ' ' > i A  (0 (.) ' ' < i A ). 
Substituting (2) into (1), we define the technological and ecological set conditional on 
exogenous variables income i I , population  i N , emissions  j Y  from the other countries, and the 
share of deposits of domestic emission  ii α : 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 See http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/nitr_h1.htm.   7
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Finally, we assume that the decision process inside the country leads to a Pareto-
efficient allocation of resources. We assume that a representative individual obtains utility 
from the consumption of the private good  i c  and the environmental quality  i Q , which we 
assume is a pure domestic public good. The efficient allocation of private consumption and 
environmental quality is characterized by maximizing the representative utility: 
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given the conditional set (3).  
A necessary condition for efficiency is the familiar Samuelson rule for provision of the 
public good: the sum of marginal willingness to pay across individuals equals the marginal 




Q c i i i i i MRT MRS N = . This condition defines the 
efficient private consumption and environmental quality. Substituting the efficient allocation 
into (2) gives us emissions as a function of the exogenous variables i I , i N ,  j Y , and ii α . We 
assume that this function may be described by a linear approximation: 
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where the θ  parameters summarize our prediction of how emissions vary across countries 
and time.  
The impact of income on emissions is ambiguous if both private consumption and 
environmental quality are normal goods; for mathematical details, see the appendix. Increased   8
private consumption will induce greater pollution from the production of the private good. On 
the other hand, an increase in income will induce higher demand for environmental quality, 
and some of the income increase will be used for abatement. Clearly, the net impact of 
income on emissions is positive if the first effect dominates, otherwise it is negative. 
Increasing returns to scale in the abatement technology will strengthen the negative effect. 
The effect of an increase in population, N, on emissions is also ambiguous. On the one 
hand, an increase in population increases the total consumption—given that the average 
consumption is constant—and, therefore, both factors increase the pollution-generating 
production of the private good and reduce the resources used for abatement. Both effects will 
increase domestic emissions. On the other hand, increased population reduces the average 
consumption and reduces emissions. Finally, increased emissions from other countries j or an 
increase in one of the parameters  ii α  reduce emissions in country i as long as private 
consumption and environmental quality are substitutes.  
Empirical evidence suggests that, for some pollutants, emission per capita and average 
incomes per capita follow an inverted U-shaped pattern. This relationship is called an 
“environmental Kuznets curve” after Kuznets (1955), who found evidence that inequality 
follows an inverted U-shaped form of per capita income over time. Both the World Bank 
(1992) and Grossman and Krueger (1995) find empirical evidence for environmental Kuznets 
curves for some pollutants, whereas Harbaugh et al. (2001) find little support using an 
updated and revised version of the data set used by Grossman and Krueger.
4 To capture the 
possibility of an environmental Kuznets curve, we include a quadratic term in income.  
 
                                                           
4 One explanation for the inverted U-shaped curve is that this reflects the natural progression of economic 
development from clean agricultural economies, to polluting industrial economies, to clean service economies. A 
second explanation is that environmental quality is an inferior good for low-income earners and a normal good 
for high-income earners. A third theoretical explanation is that it is due to economies of scale in abatement 
technologies; see Andreoni and Levinson (2001).   9
4. Evaluating the agreement effect 
The purpose of the empirical part of the paper is to assess the effect of the Sofia Protocol on 
nitrogen oxide (NOX) emissions. We aim to accomplish that goal using methods from the 
microeconometric program evaluation literature.
5 Let 
1
it Y denote country i’s emissions in year t 
(measured in logs) if it has signed the treaty, and let 
0
it Y denote its emissions if it has not. The 
parameter of interest is  ) (
0 1
it it Y Y E − = ∆ , where E is the expectation operator. Clearly, this 
entity may not be observed directly, as the same country cannot be observed as both having 
signed the treaty and not having signed it in the same period. It is therefore necessary to use 
non-signatory countries to observe the behaviour of signatory countries. Rewriting the 






it it it U X Y + + = θ θ  (6) 
 
where we have gathered the right-side variables in the vector X,  θ  is the corresponding 
coefficient vector, and θ 0 is the intercept. U is a random variable with zero expectation that 
picks up the effect of unobserved factors. Assume that the corresponding equation for a 
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In other words, we assume that the effect of observable variables (θ ) is the same for 
signatory and non-signatory countries, but the effect on unobservable variables is not 
necessarily the same. The effect of signing the treaty is picked up by γ .   10
Let Dit = 1 if country i has signed in period t, and 0 otherwise. Simply subtracting the 
average of (6) from the average of (7), with period t data, yields a biased estimator unless 
) 0 | ( ) 1 | (
0 1 = = = it it it it D U E D U E . This is the well-known selection bias problem. However, 
with panel data available, we may use the difference in differences estimator: 
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To evaluate (8), we need data on countries that had signed in t but not in t – 1. Using (6) 
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the necessary assumption for unbiasedness is: 
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Note that (9) is equivalent to: 
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In other words, the identifying assumption is that in the absence of the agreement, the 
change over time would be the same for countries that signed the treaty and countries that did 
not. To obtain the difference in differences estimator, we run the regression:  
 
it t i it t i it t i it X X D D Y Y ε θ γ θ + − + − + = − − − − ) ( ' ) (
~
1 , 1 , 0 1 , . (11) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 See, for example, Moffitt (1991) for a simple exposition of the most commonly applied methods, or Heckman 
et al. (1999) for a comprehensive overview.   11
 
The constant term allows a common trend. To identify the effect, it is necessary to have 
at least one pre-agreement and one post-agreement observation for countries that signed and 
countries that did not. 
An additional econometric problem is posed by the spatial nature of the data. Rewriting 
the linearized emission equation as:  
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where  ∑ ≠ − =
i j jt t ji t i Y Y , ,
~
α and the vector W contains variables other than emissions and 
transport coefficients, it is clear that the variable  t i Y ,
~
−  (country i’s imported emissions) is 
correlated with Uit. Consider some country k≠ i: Yit, and thus Uit, is included in  t k Y ,
~
−  and 
thereby in Ykt. Therefore,  t i Y ,
~
−  is correlated with Uit, and the standard OLS assumptions are 
violated. In previous contributions based on cross-section data, for example, Murdoch et al. 
(1997, 2003) the problem has been addressed by applying spatial autoregression methods 
(Anselin 1988). Here, however, we use panel data and thus we are able to use lagged value 
variables as instruments, assuming that the errors are not serially correlated.
6 
 
5. Data and variables  
Our analysis utilizes data from 25 European countries for the period 1980–96. As noted, the 
Sofia Protocol is one of nine (to date) follow-up protocols of the LRTAP convention, which 
was signed in Geneva in 1979. All of our 25 countries have signed and ratified the Geneva 
Convention. The Sofia Protocol was signed on 1 November 1988 and came into force on 25 
                                                           
6 As the model is estimated in first differences, the instruments are lagged twice.   12
November 1990.
7 For countries ratifying at a later date, the Protocol comes into force nine 
days after their respective ratification dates (Article 15 part 2).  
We classify countries as “participants” if they ratified the Sofia Protocol by the end of 
1994 and “non-participants” if they did not. There are 18 participant countries and seven non-
participant countries. Greece (1998) and Belgium (2000) have ratified the Protocol, but since 




(Table 1 about here)  
 
As mentioned above, the Sofia Protocol was signed on 1 November 1988, but since we 
only have annual data, we use 1989 as the signing year. If we assume that countries rationally 
expected to ratify the Protocol at a later date, the signing year 1989 seems a natural choice for 
the “treatment” year. An alternative arrangement of the data is to use the year in which the 
Protocol “came into force” as the “treatment” year. For most of the countries, this is 1991 (13 
countries). For the rest of the participants, the Protocol came into force in later years, but 
always before 1994, as shown in Table 1. Using this alternative definition of the “treatment” 
year left the results did not change the results much, however. 
The political geography of Europe has changed since the LRTAP convention was 
signed in 1979. Some countries have been split up, and two German states have been unified 
into one country. Owing to data limitations, both before and after the political changes, we 
treat the Czech Republic and Slovakia as one unit, and the same applies to the former Soviet 
Union states.
9 Furthermore, Germany is treated as one unit during the whole period, since 
                                                           
7 According to Article 15, the protocol comes into force nine days after the sixteenth country ratifies it. 
8 Liechtenstein is excluded owing to a lack of data. 
9 We only have data for Belarus, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Lithuania and Moldova.   13
there are no separate data for East and West Germany after the reunion. The Former Republic 
of Yugoslavia is omitted from our analysis since the data are poor. 
Data on NOX emissions are taken from Table 2 on EMEP’s homepage.
10 We use the 
source-receptor matrix in EMEP (1997) to derive the import of NOX deposits and the share of 
a country’s NOX emission deposit in the specific country’s own geographical area ( ii α ). As 
part of the EMEP Protocol, transportation matrices between parties for different pollutants 
such as nitrogen oxides and sulfur are calculated.  
The GDP data are based on UN Statistical Yearbooks for 1993 and 1995. To ensure 
consistency in the entire time series, we compare the observations for 1987 for each country 
in the two editions. If the deviations are substantial, we use growth rates in the 1993 edition to 
calculate GDP numbers for 1980–86, using the figure for 1987 in the 1995 edition as a 
starting point. Population data are from the UN Statistical Yearbook for 1995, using GDP and 
GDP per capita to calculate the size of the population.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
Summary statistics in Table 2 reveal noticeable differences between participating and 
non-participating countries. For the Sofia Protocol, the participant countries have more than 
twice the GDP per capita of the non-participating countries. Furthermore, the participating 
countries have more NOX emissions, and average emissions per capita are higher than for 
non-participating countries. However, NOX emissions per GDP for participators are 
considerably lower. This indicates a more intensive use of NOX in industry in non-
participating than in participating countries.  
                                                           
10 The Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air 
Pollutants in Europe (the EMEP programme) monitors emissions regulated by the LRTAP convention. The data 
are from Table 2 in http://projects.dnmi.no/~emep/emis_tables/tab2.html.   14
The political changes in Europe might have had an effect on emission behaviour. 
Therefore, we include a control dummy variable for the former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe, reflecting the transition process. We use 1991 as the transition year, 
indicating post-transition with a dummy. Sensitivity analysis of the transition year (1988, 
1989, 1990) reveals small changes in numbers and did not alter the results. We classify 
Germany among the transition countries as well, since the former East Germany was a 
communist country. This gives the reunited Germany the same characteristics as other East 
European countries, with a relatively large amount of polluting, inefficient industry to close.
11 
As we can see from the summary statistics, there are slightly more transition countries among 
the non-participating countries.  
 
(Figure 1 about here)  
 
For a first impression of the potential effect of the agreement, let us have an exploratory 
look at the data. In Figure 1, we have normalized NOX emissions by indexing on 1987, the 
target year for emissions until 1994. The data are sorted according to whether countries 
belong to the group of signatory or non-signatory countries. Looking at the average 
participating country, there seems to be no clear trend before 1987. If anything, the tendency 
is increasing from 1984 and decreasing from 1987. There actually seems to be a clearer 
downward trend from 1989, the year that we define as the agreement year. In 1994, all but 
three signatory countries had emissions below the target level. The picture for the average of 
the non-signatory countries—seven by our definition—is noisy, but there seems to be an 
increase until 1987, with no clear trend thereafter. Even so, we must note that only two of the 
non-participating countries for which we have data in 1994 had not decreased emissions 
below the 1987 level. We recall from the previous section that the identifying assumption of 
                                                           
11 Classifying Germany as a non-transition country did not change the results.    15
the difference in differences estimator is that the pre-agreement trend for signatory and non-
signatory countries should be the same. With the possible exception of 1980–82, and taking 
into account the small sample size, we contend that the data do not reject that assumption.
12 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
The impression that the agreement countries perform better is reinforced by Figure 2, 
which shows the NOX growth rated in order of size (the change in the log of emissions). 
After 1990, the growth of the median signatory country is clearly below that of the median 
non-signatory country, but we also see an upward trend for both groups. Summing up, the 
message from the raw data seems to be that the agreement worked. However, the decision 
process modelled in section 3 has not been taken into account. To accomplish that, we now 
turn to results from our econometric model. 
 
6. Results 
Table 3 shows results from estimating equation (11) with NOX emissions in logs and 
explanatory variables as detailed in the previous section. Except for the participation and 
transition country dummies, the independent variables are in logs, and their coefficients may 
be interpreted as elasticities. OLS and IV estimates are reported. In addition, we report results 
from a regression simply on the participation dummy and a constant term. This is tantamount 
to comparing the average outcomes, and gives an impression of the potential bias in the treaty 
effect that results from not taking the economic model into account.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
                                                           
12 Owing to missing background information, the first year used in the regressions is 1986.   16
First, we comment on the OLS results. The coefficient on the “Signed treaty” variable is 
significant at the 0.01% level in the OLS results, confirming the impression from the 
descriptive statistics and Figure 1 that signing the treaties had an effect on the participating 
countries’ emissions. The estimated coefficient of –0.024 means that yearly average 
reductions in NOX emissions were approximately 2.4% greater for participating than for non-
participating countries. This can be interpreted as the effect of the Sofia Protocol. In addition, 
we note that simply comparing mean outcomes without controlling for country characteristics 
overestimates the treaty effect by more than 40%—the coefficient decreases to –0.034. On the 
other hand, including country characteristics decreases the treaty effect by about 30%, which 
gives an estimate of how much of the difference between signatory and non-signatory 
countries is accounted for by country characteristics. 
Turning to the other results, we unexpectedly find that there is no significant effect from 
imported NOX on own emissions. However, the sign is negative as expected. The same is the 
case for the part of a country’s emissions that is deposited on its own soil (α ii). The statistical 
insignificance may be a consequence of first-differencing, which takes out much of the cross-
sectional variation in the data—there is not much time-variation in α ii and α ji.
13 The effect of 
GDP, the empirical counterpart to income in the theoretical model, is positive but decreasing 
(the turning point at log GDP = 5.4 is outside the sample). This is consistent with the 
predicted counteracting effects of pollution increasing with increased production, at the same 
time as increased income leads to a greater demand for environmental quality. However, the 
first effect dominates. The concave shape is consistent with the idea of an “environmental 
Kuznets curve”. Population size has a negative and significant effect on emissions. This 
variable, too, has an ambiguous effect in the theoretical model. Our result indicates that the 
dominant effect of population is that, at a given income level, it reduces average consumption 
                                                           
13 In a pooled OLS regression in levels, both variables came out as significant.   17
and thus the polluting by-product of consumption production. Finally, we note that the 
estimated –0.028 for the “Transition country” variable means that NOX emission reductions 
are approximately 2.8% greater in the transition economies than in other countries. Taking 
into account the high pre-transition pollution levels in these countries, the result is reasonable 
and indicates that the potential for improvement was greater in those economies. 
We noted in the previous section that, owing to the spatial nature of the data, the OLS 
assumption that explanatory variables are uncorrelated to the error term is violated. However, 
the IV results, and in particular the treaty effect, are quite similar to OLS. A Hausman test 
does not reject OLS in favour of IV. Admittedly, our instruments (lagged values of the right- 
side variables) are only weakly correlated to the problematic variable, imported NOX. On the 
other hand, they pass the Sargan test for not being correlated to the error term. Furthermore, 
the endogenous variable is insignificant. This could be a consequence of endogeneity but, as 
noted above, we think that it results from the first-difference transformation. For this reason, 
we believe that the endogeneity of this variable does not seriously affect the estimate of the 
treaty effect, which is the focus of interest in this paper. 
How do our findings compare to the received literature? The results seem to differ from 
Murdoch et al. (1997a), who consider the Helsinki and Sofia Protocols and find that the latter 
has no effect on emissions, in the sense that the participation dummy was insignificant. 
However, their approach differs from ours, in that they estimate a model derived from a Nash 
representation on cross-sectional data for the pre- and post-agreement periods separately.
14 
Thus, their results test the relevance of their behavioural model rather than the effect of the 
treaty. Their key variable is spillins (imported NOX in our notation), which is interpreted as a 
strategic response variable. When this variable comes out as significant and negative, it is 
interpreted as confirming strategic free riding. By contrast, we use the time- and cross-section 
variations in the full panel, before and after signing the Sofia agreement, for a direct   18
assessment of the agreement effect. As noted above, it is difficult to identify the effect of 
spillins with the panel data estimator. Our focus and empirical approach are different, and 
therefore the results are not necessarily at odds.  
As a final caveat, it is clear that the credibility of our results hinges on the identifying 
assumption that, in the absence of the treaty, the change-over time would be the same for 
participating and non-participating countries. The graphic inspection of data in the previous 
section at least did not provide evidence against the hypothesis. It may be problematic that the 
sample size is small, particularly for the non-participating countries. However, that criticism 
also applies to previous work in this field. 
 
7. Conclusions 
We started out by asking if environmental agreements do have effects on emissions. In 
relation to the Sofia Protocol, our answer is “yes”. Analysing annual data for ratifiers of the 
LRTAP convention before and after the Sofia Protocol, we find that annual reductions in 
emissions were approximately 2.4 percent greater then they would have been if the Sofia 
agreement had not been signed. If one accepts the fundamental assumption of the empirical 
analysis, this may be interpreted as the effect of countries signing the treaty and thus 
committing themselves to meeting the targets. Admittedly, this conclusion may be placed in 
question by the somewhat limited data. Nevertheless, our conclusions bear some promise for 
the future of international co-operation in controlling damage to the environment. A topic for 
future research should be the application of similar methods to assess the effects of other 
international agreements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
14 Their outcome variables are emission reductions during 1985–87 and 1988–90.   19
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Appendix 
Note that if both the private good and environmental quality are normal goods, then: 
1
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We find the impact of income on emissions by substituting efficient private consumption into 



























The first term in (A1) is positive and the second is negative. Hence, the net effect of income 
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The direct effect—the first term in the second set of parentheses—of an increase in population 
is to increase the production of the pollution-generating consumption good and to reduce 








Clearly, the net effect depends on the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect effects.  
Finally, increased emissions from another country j or an increase of ii α , described by 
0 > − ij dY , reduces emissions in country i as long as private consumption and environmental 
quality are substitutes. To see this, we differentiate efficient emission with respect to emission 
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since the expression in the parentheses is positive by assumption. As long as private 
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Table 1. The Sofia agreement 
  Date of signature  Ratification % of 1987 emissions
a 
Austria 01.11.1988  15.01.1990 80.9 
Bulgaria 01.11.1988  30.03.1989 60.5 
Czech Republic  01.11.1988  01.01.1993 n.a. 
Slovakia 01.11.1988  28.05.1993 58 
Denmark 01.11.1988  01.03.1993 86.5 
Finland 01.11.1988  01.02.1990 93.5 
France 01.11.1988  20.07.1989 102 
Germany 01.11.1988  16.11.1990 61.4 
Hungary 03.05.1989  12.11.1991 72.2 
Ireland 01.05.1989  17.10.1994 102.3 
Italy 01.11.1988  19.05.1992 98.2
c 
Luxembourg 01.11.1988  04.10.1990 103.2
b 
Netherlands 01.11.1988  11.10.1989 84 
Norway 01.11.1988  11.10.1989 95.5 
Russia   01.11.1988  21.06.1989 79.8 
Spain 01.11.1988  04.12.1990 137.1
d 
Sweden 01.11.1988  27.07.1990 71.2 
Switzerland 01.11.1988  18.09.1990 77.6 
United Kingdom  01.11.1988  15.10.1990 81.3 
Belgium 01.11.1988  31.10.2000 100.5 
Greece 01.11.1988    24.04.1998 118.7
b 
Poland
  01.11.1988 73.6 
Iceland   125
c 
Portugal   415.6
b,c 
Romania   55
e 
Turkey   162.4
f 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe web page 
Notes: 
a Average NOX emissions 1994–96 as % of 1987 unless otherwise noted 
b Reference year 1985 
c Average emissions 1994–95 
d 1993 emissions 
e 1994 emissions 
f 1995 emissions 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, before and after the Sofia protocol was signed 
  All countries  Signatory countries  Non-signatory countries 
  Before After  Before  After  Before  After 
  Mean  Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Full sample                   0.418 
Nox emissions  0.972  1.043 0.893 1.027 1.089 1.113  0.990 1.114 0.492 0.445 0.524 0.026 
Nox em. per capita  0.044  0.028 0.042 0.023 0.048 0.028  0.044 0.023 0.032 0.022 0.037 0.074 
Nox em./GDP  0.052  0.067 0.049 0.060 0.043 0.061  0.040 0.052 0.087 0.079 0.083  
Observations 178 176  143  134  35 35 
Estimating sample      
Nox emissions  0.973  1.062 0.890 1.035 1.096 1.154  0.990 1.122 0.574 0.529 0.519 0.423 
Nox em. per capita  0.045  0.027 0.042 0.023 0.049 0.028  0.044 0.023 0.035 0.022 0.037 0.026 
Nox em./GDP  0.052  0.067 0.049 0.060 0.041 0.056  0.040 0.053 0.090 0.088 0.085 0.074 
Nox import  0.102  0.130 0.093 0.125 0.111 0.143  0.100 0.136 0.073 0.064 0.065 0.061 
Nox domestic  0.313  0.166 0.323 0.168 0.326 0.173  0.338 0.172 0.269  0.139 0.263 0.139 
GDP 37.382  46.259 39.177 49.033 46.268 49.530 46.731 52.494 8.355 6.271 9.100 7.604 
Population 24.245  21.724 22.942 21.100 23.852 22.248 22.497 21.666 25.528 20.599 23.709 19.286 
Observations  64  166 49 132 15 34 
Before: 1980–1987; After: 1988–1996  
The estimating sample is smaller than the full sample owing to differencing and missing observations on Nox imports 
Emissions in 100,000 tons 
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Table 3. Regression results (first differences) 
 OLS  IV 
Coef SE t Coef SE t Coef SE t 
Signed treaty  –0.024  0.008 –3.16 –0.034 0.009 –3.96 –0.023 0.008 –2.73 
Imported NOX  –0.021  0.027 –0.78 –0.039 0.209 0.19 
Domestic NOX  –0.020  0.028 –0.71 –0.035 0.079 –0.44 
GDP 0.947  0.163 5.81 0.902 0.247 3.66 
(GDP)
2  –0.089 0.029 –3.11 –0.086 0.039 –2.21 
Population –1.894  0.663 –2.86 –1.953 0.869 –2.25 
Transition country  –0.028  0.012 –2.35 –0.027 0.013 –2.12 
Constant 0.002  0.007 0.30 0.008 0.007 1.21 0.002 0.009 0.26 
R-squared 0.310  0.060  0.281 
Sargan  test          2.896  (p=0.41) 
Wu–Hausman  test          0.090  (p=0.76) 
Observations 230  230  208 
Dependent variable is log of Nox emissions 
All variables except “Signed treaty” and “Transition country” are in logs 
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Figure 2. NOX growth rates 1981–1996, with median bands 
 